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MR. LEWIS GOES TO WASHINGTON
(AND GETS HIS CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS STEPPED ON):
A CRITICISM OF THE SUPREME COURT
DECISION IN LEWIS V. UNITED STATES
Peter J. Schmidt
Providing an accused with the right to be tried by a jury of his peers
gave him an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzeal-
ous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric
judge.'
INTRODUCTION
The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the right to
trial by jury.2 This right has never been accorded to all those tried in
the criminal courts of this country.3 The United States Supreme
Court has laid down rules, through several decisions, that effectively
guarantee that no criminal defendant can be sentenced to more than
six-months imprisonment without having the right to a jury trial.4
While these decisions are somewhat recent, they reflect the Court's
long-standing belief that minimal sentences do not require the right to
1. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
2. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
3. Compare Duncan, 391 U.S. at 160 (removing petty offenses as a crime needing a jury trial),
and District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 624 (1937) (explaining instances when a trial
by jury is not extended), with Alan L. Adelstein, A Corporation's Right to a Jury Trial Under the
Sixth Amendment, 27 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 375, 393 (1994) (presenting the argument that the
framers, due to their fear of centralized government, intended to provide a jury trial for all
federal criminal offenses created by Congress).
4. Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 517 (1974) (holding that a defendant sentenced to
a total greater than six months imprisonment for multiple criminal contempts had a right to a
jury trial); Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 496 (1974) (holding that a defendant charged with
multiple counts of criminal contempt, where there was no set maximum punishment, had no jury
trial right because he faced no more than six months total imprisonment); Baldwin v. New York,
399 U.S. 66, 69 (1970) (establishing a bright-line rule that six months authorized imprisonment
for an offense gives the accused the right to a jury trial); Duncan, 391 U.S. at 162 (holding that a
crime punishable by two years is serious, requiring a jury trial).
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a jury trial, while more serious intrusions into the liberty of an accused
do.5
This application of the Sixth Amendment's guarantees by the courts
of this country, which has stood for nearly two hundred years, has
been placed on very unsteady ground by the Supreme Court in its
recent decision in Lewis v. United States.6 In Lewis, the Court held
that a criminal defendant facing charges for multiple petty offenses
has no constitutional right to trial by jury, regardless of the aggregate
sentence facing such a defendant.7 The fate of all future such defend-
ants, therefore, shall rest entirely in one swing of a judge's gavel. Jus-
tice Kennedy, in his concurring opinion, called the majority's holding,
"one of the most serious incursions on the right to jury trial in the
Court's history."8
In the Supreme Court's decision in District of Columbia v.
Clawans,9 where the Court first ruled that the maximum sentence au-
thorized by the criminal statutes would influence the right to jury
trial,' 0 Justice McReynolds stated in a separate opinion: "Constitu-
tional guarantees ought not to be subordinated to convenience, nor
denied upon questionable precedents or uncertain reasoning.""
While this statement was without majority support, it is clearly in line
with the history of the Supreme Court's decisions. It is doubtful any-
one well-versed in the history of constitutional jurisprudence in this
country would disagree. This Note will demonstrate that the Court's
decision in Lewis ignored all three of Justice McReynolds' warnings
and is unjustifiable on other grounds as well.
Part I of this Note discusses the Supreme Court decisions leading up
to Lewis and gives a review of how lower courts have dealt with this
issue. 12 Part II reviews the various opinions of the Supreme Court in
its decision in Lewis v. United States.13 Part III analyzes the Court's
treatment of this issue and offers several grounds on which the deci-
5. See generally Baldwin, 399 U.S. at 73; Duncan, 391 U.S. at 159-160; Romualdo P. Eclavea,
Annotation, Right to Jury Trial Under Federal Constitution Where Two or More Petty Offenses,
Each Having Panelty of Less Than 6 Months' Imprisonment, Have Potential Aggregate Penalty in
Excess of 6 Months When Tried Together, 26 A.L.R. FED. 736 (1976).
6. 116 S.Ct. 2163 (1996).
7. Id. at 2168.
8. Id. at 2169 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy found the majority holding objec-
tionable "both in its doctrinal formulation and in its practical effect." Id.
9. 300 U.S. 617 (1937).
10. Id. at 625.
11. Id. at 634 (McReynolds, J., concurring).
12. See infra Part I.
13. See infra Part II.
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sion is in error.14 Part IV will discuss the likely impact of the Court's
decision in Lewis.15
I. A SHORT HISTORY OF SIXTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
Article III, Section 2, Clause 3 of the United States Constitution
states: "The trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall
be by jury .... ",16 This guarantee to the citizens of the United States
was further supported by the Bill of Rights. The Sixth Amendment
states: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury. ...."17 This reem-
phasis on jury trial protection shows the primacy the framers of the
Constitution placed upon the jury trial as a tool for the protection of
the citizenry against tyrannical government.' 8
A. Drawing the Line Between Petty and Serious
Despite the seemingly unequivocal language of the Constitution, it
was clear early on that the courts did not intend to read these phrases
literally, as requiring jury trials in all criminal prosecutions. "The
right of trial by jury ... does not extend to every criminal proceeding.
At the time of the adoption of the Constitution there were numerous
offenses, commonly described as 'petty,' which were tried summarily
without a jury .... -19 These petty offenses, though covering a wide
range of unlawful behavior, had in common the fact that they were
crimes which carried the least intrusive sentence, either in terms of
prison time or fine.20 For some time after the Constitution was rati-
fied, the courts, in determining whether a certain charge warranted a
right to trial by jury, would look to whether the crime carried such a
right at common law.2 ' In District of Columbia v. Clawans,22 the
14. See infra Part Il.
15. See infra Part IV.
16. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
17. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
18. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 152-56 (1968) (summarizing the nation's efforts to
protect its people's rights by promoting jury trials).
19. District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 624 (1937).
20. Id. at 624; see Felix Frankfurter & Thomas G. Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and the
Constitutional Guaranty of Trial by Jury, 39 HARV. L. REV. 917, 969-70 (1926) (commenting on
how the framers of the Constitution took the common law and colonial pratice for granted when
drafting the Sixth Amendment and intended to exclude petty offenses from trial by jury).
21. See Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 555-56 (1888) (looking to the common law practice to
find that the offense of conspiracy was one of serious character, had detrimental consequences
for the public and was triable only before a jury). Though this Note will show that the practice
of looking to the common law is no longer the favored approach, it still exists. See Landry v.
Hoepfner, 840 F.2d 1201, 1210 (5th Cir. 1988) (stating that there is no right to a jury trial for
driving while intoxicated (DWI) because the offense was not indictable at common law); Frank-
1997]
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Supreme Court held for the first time that in determining whether a
charge was petty or serious for jury trial consideration, a court should
consider the severity of the maximum penalty authorized by statute.23
It appears the Court felt that the judiciary should not make subjective
judgements as to the seriousness of the offense. Rather, the court
stated that the focus should be on objective standards, such as the
legislative determination of the length of imprisonment of one con-
victed of such a crime, which is viewed as a reflection of the people's
wishes.2 4 As will be seen, this desire for an objective standard repeat-
edly shaped the Court's subsequent decisions.
In the latter half of this century, the Supreme Court continued this
trend, moving toward a strict focus on the legislatively authorized pen-
alty as the sole basis for a determination of "petty" or "serious. '25
The Court identified the basis behind this focus and laid out standards
for determining whether a right to trial by jury existed.26
In two cases decided two years apart, the Supreme Court laid out
rough parameters of what length of sentence would be sufficient to
consider a crime serious. 27 In Cheff v. Schnackenburg,28 the Court de-
cided that an offense carrying a maximum penalty of six months im-
prisonment was petty and, therefore, invoked no right to trial by
jury.29 This decision stopped short, however, of setting a clear line
separating serious from petty.30 Two years later, in Duncan v. Louisi-
ana,31 the Court held that a crime punishable by two years imprison-
ment is a serious offense, giving the accused a right to trial by jury.32
Again, no clear dividing line was set.33
furter & Corcoran, supra note 20, at 917 (discussing the exclusion of petty offenses from the
protection of the Sixth Amendment's right to a trial by jury).
22. 300 U.S. 617 (1937).
23. Id. at 625.
24. Id. at 624-25. Though significant for the trend it began, the Court made only a small step
away from adherence to common law standards. The court stated that a jury trial would be
awarded for an offense considered trivial at common law if the current penalty would make it
comparable with serious crimes at common law. Id.
25. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 160 (1968); Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373,
379-80 (1966).
26. Supra note 25.
27. Supra note 25.
28. 384 U.S. 373.
29. Id. at 379-80.
30. Id.
31. 391 U.S. 145.
32. Id. at 160 (quoting the call in Clawans to use the legislative penalty "as a guage of [the
locality's] social and ethical judgments" of the offense).
33. Id. at 162.
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The decision in Duncan picked up where Clawans left off. The
Court again raised the use of the legislatively authorized penalty as a
basis for determining the question of seriousness 34 and stated that this
maximum authorized penalty was to be the major factor in making the
determination.35 Again, the Court wished to have objective criteria
for determining the right to jury trial, (stating, in fact, that the decision
in Clawans demanded it), and found such in the laws of the nation.36
Also, the Court explicitly rejected the claim that its prior decisions
focused the analysis on the sentence actually imposed by the courts.37
Where the legislature has set a maximum penalty for an offense, that
should be the basis of the decision on the right to jury trial, regardless
of the sentence actually imposed.38
In Baldwin v. New York, 39 the Court held, in a plurality opinion,
that a defendant facing a possible one year sentence for a misde-
meanor offense was entitled to a trial by jury.40 In the first attempt at
judicial demarcation in this area, three Justices called for a sentence of
six months to be the line between petty and serious. 41 Any offense
punishable by more than six months in jail would qualify as serious
and would invoke the right to a jury trial.42 These Justices again called
for the use of legislative maximum sentence as the best objective crite-
ria for finding the seriousness of an offense.43 In a concurring opinion,
Justices Black and Douglas provided the plurality support, calling for
a literal reading of the Sixth Amendment, with a right to a jury trial in
all criminal prosecutions."
34. Id. at 161.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 162 n.35 (distinguishing the decision in Cheff v. Schnackenburg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966),
which focused on the sentence actually imposed, on the grounds that the offense in question was
for criminal contempt, which has no legislative maximum penalty).
38. As this Note will discuss, this statement is important in the case of multiple petty offenses,
for some courts have responded by focusing on the sentence imposed in such cases.
39. 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
40. Id. at 69.
41. Id. Justices White, Brennan, and Marshall rejected the argument that the barrier should
accord with the felony/misdemeanor distinction, which would result in the denial of jury trial to
defendants facing up to one year in prison. Id. Though only three Justices agreed on this divid-
ing line, it has since gained majority support and is the rule used by the Court in such cases. See
Lewis v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 2163, 2166 (1996); Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 512
(1974).
42. Baldwin, 399 U.S. at 69.
43. Id. at 70.
44. Id. at 74-75 (Black, J., concurring).
19971
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B. Creating a New Standard for Criminal Contempt
The Supreme Court had to fashion a new rule for cases concerning
criminal contempt prosecutions because most jurisdictions have no
maximum penalty proscribed by statute for such offenses.45 These
contempt cases are the precedent that the Court has abandoned in
Lewis and they are the basis of much of the dissension expressed by
the lower courts.
In Taylor v. Hayes,46 the defendant was charged with nine counts of
criminal contempt and was tried without a jury.47 The Court quickly
denied the claim by the petitioner that any criminal contempt charge
must be heard by a jury. It stated that when the legislature has set no
maximum sentence for criminal contempt, there is no right to jury
trial if the sentence actually imposed by the court is six months impris-
onment or less.48 A more severe sentence, it seems, would render the
contempt serious and invoke the jury trial right. As to the multiple
counts facing the petitioner, the Court held that although the original
order was for the sentences to run consecutively, which totaled more
than four years, the sentence was later reduced to concurrent
sentences, none greater than six months.49 Therefore, the Supreme
Court held that "[t]he eight contempts, whether considered singly or
collectively, thus constituted petty offenses, and trial by jury was not
required."50 The Court agreed with the Kentucky Court of Appeals
that the concurrent sentences were the equivalent to a single sentence
of six months. 51 The Court expressly approved the use of pre-trial
determinations by judges hearing contempt cases as a proper method
of deciding the issue of the right to a jury trial.52
In the same year as the Taylor decision, the Court again faced the
right of a jury trial for multiple criminal contempt charges in Codispoti
v. Pennsylvania.5 3 In Codispoti, the defendant was convicted on seven
counts of criminal contempt.5 4 He received six months for each of six
45. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 162 n.35 (1968).
46. 418 U.S. 488 (1974).
47. Id. at 490.
48. Id. at 495 (citing Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968), Cheff v. Schnackenburg, 384 U.S.
373 (1966) and others, for the proposition that an actual sentence of six months or less renders
the contempt petty).
49. Id. at 495-96.
50. Id. at 496.
51. Id. The Court failed to state definitively that had the Kentucky Court of Appeals not
amended the original sentence, the aggregate of the petty contempts would have invoked a jury
trial, though that is the apparent implication.
52. Id. at 495-96.
53. 418 U.S. 506 (1974).
54. Id. at 507.
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counts and three months for the seventh count, with all sentences to
run consecutively and, therefore, faced a total sentence of over three
years.55 Unlike the sentence in Taylor, Codispoti's lengthy sentence
was not amended and was still in place when the case came before the
Supreme Court.56 The Court followed its decision in Taylor and ear-
lier criminal contempt cases57 and focused on the penalty actually im-
posed by the trial court since there was no maximum penalty set for
this offense by the legislature.58 While the language in Taylor implied
that there might have been a different result had the multi-year sen-
tence not been reduced by the lower court,59 the Court's decision in
Codispoti seemed to make this point clear.60 The Court expressly re-
jected the claim that since no more than six months was imposed for
any single count, each contempt was a petty offense, triable without a
jury.61 The majority found that since the multiple counts were tried in
one proceeding and the aggregate sentence faced by the defendant
was "several times more than six months, each contemnor was tried
for what was equivalent to a serious offense and was entitled to a jury
trial." 62
C. Multiple Petty Offenses in the Lower Courts
Prior to the aforementioned cases, as well as in the years following,
many lower courts faced the issue of whether multiple petty offenses
charged in one proceeding, with an aggregate potential penalty of
greater than six months, invoked a right to trial by jury. All of these
cases were outside the context of criminal contempt. Prior to United
States v. Lewis, most courts read the Supreme Court's decisions as
endorsing one of two approaches. Some courts aggregated the maxi-
mum penalties authorized by the legislature for the multiple charges
and granted the defendant a jury trial if they totaled greater than six
months imprisonment. 63 Other courts, relying on Taylor and Codis-
poti, held that the sentence actually imposed by the court was the
55. Id. at 509.
56. Id. at 511.
57. See, e.g., Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 211 (1968) (holding that looking to the penalty
actually imposed is the best indicator of the seriousness of the offense).
58. Codispoti, 418 U.S. at 511.
59. Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 495-96 (1974).
60. Codispoti, 418 U.S. at 516-17.
61. Id. at 517.
62. Id.
63. See infra notes 65-70 and accompanying text.
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point of focus and only those defendants actually receiving a sentence
of greater than six months were granted a jury trial.64
The Ninth Circuit faced the issue of multiple petty offenses in Rife
v. Godbehere.65 In Rife, the defendant was charged with multiple
petty offenses and was originally sentenced to one year in jail before
the sentence was lowered to six months. 66 In deciding whether the
defendant had a right to trial by jury, the Ninth Circuit likened such a
case to the imposition of a sentence when no statutory maximum
exists:
[W]here the judge has discretion to impose [imprisonment of] more
than six months by imposing consecutive sentences, just as where he
has discretion to impose more than six months because there is no
statutory maximum, it is the judge's [actual] exercise of his discre-
tion, not the mere fact that he has discretion, that determines
whether the offense is "petty." 67
Therefore, the approach taken by this court is similar to that of the
Supreme Court in Taylor.68 The defendant was eventually sentenced
to less than six months, so the fact that he could have been sentenced
to more and, in fact, initially was sentenced to more, was irrelevant.
All that mattered was that the defendant did not ultimately face more
than six months imprisonment absent a jury trial.69 Perhaps most im-
portant to this decision was the fact that the appellate court looked to
the aggregate of the sentences actually imposed, rather than whether
the sentence for any one individual sentence exceeded six months.
This focus on the aggregate penalty actually imposed upon these de-
fendants was also adopted by other courts.70
The second approach taken by many courts prior to Lewis was to
aggregate the maximum statutory penalties actually faced by the de-
fendant.71 If that aggregate was greater than six months, the defend-
ant had a right to a trial by jury regardless of whether any of the
64. See infra notes 73-79 and accompanying text.
65. 814 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1987).
66. Id. at 564.
67. Id. at 564-65 (citing Maita v. Whitmore, 508 F.2d 143, 146 (9th Cir. 1974)).
68. See supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
69. For a ruling on what would happen if an actual sentence imposed exceeded six months, see
State v. Owens, 254 A.2d 97, 102 (N.J. 1969), where the New Jersey Supreme Court amended the
sentence imposed by the trial court, changing it from consecutive to concurrent sentences.
70. See United States v. Bencheck, 926 F.2d 1512, 1519 (10th Cir. 1991) (adopting the Taylor
approach); State v. Goering, Nos. A-93-1128, A-93-1129, A-93-1130, A-93-1133, 1994 Neb. App.
LEXIS 309, at *7-8 (Ct. App. Oct. 25, 1994) (adopting the Taylor approach for Nebraska's state
courts); Bruce v. State, 614 P.2d 813, 815 (Ariz. 1980) (discussing the Arizona Supreme Court's
adoption of the Taylor approach).
71. See infra notes 73-79 and accompanying text.
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multiple offenses was serious individually.72 These courts usually re-
jected the claim that there was no jury trial right in such a case when
the sentence actually imposed did not exceed six months.
In United States v. Coppins,73 the Fourth Circuit faced a case where
the defendant was charged with three offenses, with maximum penal-
ties of six, six, and three months.74 The defendant was convicted on
two counts and ultimately was sentenced to no time in jail.75 The
court, however, focused only upon the maximum penalty authorized,
rather than upon the sentence actually imposed.76 The court ruled
that in such a case, the aggregate of the maximum penalties author-
ized for the multiple petty offenses should be the basis for the deter-
mination of the right to a trial by jury.77 The court cited Codispoti in
support of this decision, reasoning that if the consecutive sentences of
imprisonment actually imposed for multiple counts of criminal con-
tempt should be aggregated for this determination, so too should
there be such an aggregation when the legislature has set maximum
penalties.78 The Fourth Circuit in Coppins also found support for its
position in the decisions of other courts.79
A small number of courts which follow the objective approach add
a caveat which affects the defendant's right to jury trial.80 An exam-
ple is United States v. Bencheck,8' in which the Tenth Circuit stated
that "where the trial judge announced that the sentence, in the event
of conviction, would be no more than six months' [sic] incarceration
... no jury was constitutionally required. z82 The court supported this
approach by looking to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
which allow a judge to make a pre-trial determination that the sen-
tence will be limited and to decide whether to use the Rules based on
that determination.8 3
72. Id.
73. 953 F.2d 86 (4th Cir. 1991).
74. Id. at 87-88.
75. Id. at 88.
76. Id. at 89-90.
77. Id. at 90.
78. Id.
79. ld. (citing United States v. Potvin, 481 F.2d 380, 382 (10th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Musgrave, 695 F. Supp. 231, 232-33 (W.D. Va. 1988); United States v. Coleman, 664 F. Supp. 548,
549 (D.D.C. 1985)); see also State v. Sanchez, 786 P.2d 42 (N.M. 1990).
80. See United States v. Stenzel, 49 F.3d 658, 660 (10th Cir. 1995); Nat'l Maritime Union v.
Aquaslide 'N' Dive Corp., 737 F.2d 1395, 1400 (5th Cir. 1984).
81. 926 F.2d 1512 (10th Cir. 1991).
82. Id. at 1519; see Stenzel, 49 F.3d at 660; Nat'l Maritime Union, 737 F.2d at 1400.
83. Bencheck, 926 F.2d at 1519. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 58(a)(2) states "[i]n pro-
ceedings concerning petty offenses for which no sentence of imprisonment will be imposed the
1997]
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Though judicial support for the use of either of these two ap-
proaches has been overwhelming, it has not been unanimous. Two
jurisdictions flatly rejected both of these approaches. s4 In City of
Monroe v. Wilhite, the Supreme Court of Louisiana held, in a pre-
Taylor decision, that consolidation of multiple petty offenses is merely
a procedural device and does not alter the fact that these are petty
offenses for which there is no right to a jury trial.85 Similarly, the New
York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held in People v. Foy, that
"the administrative convenience of litigating these multiple charges in
one trial did not serve to enhance the ultimate risk faced by the de-
fendant or to somehow transform the 'petty' offenses alleged to the
level of a 'serious' crime."'8 6 These two exceptions, however, should
not be viewed as in any way defeating the persuasiveness of the uni-
formity of all the other jurisdictions and the effect that uniformity
should have on the Supreme Court. In fact, decisions of these same
two jurisdictions were struck down by the Supreme Court in cases in-
volving the right to a jury trial precisely because they were the excep-
tion to a nationwide uniformity.8 7
II. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION IN LEWIS V. UNITED STATES
The preceding review of case law shows that most of this nation's
courts, and every one of the federal appellate courts that have consid-
ered the issue of multiple petty offenses tried in one proceeding, have
followed one of the two approaches outlined above. Though their
reasonings may be different, the end result of this jurisprudence is that
no defendant tried in one proceeding for multiple petty offenses may
be sentenced to greater than six months imprisonment without being
court may follow such provisions of these rules as it deems appropriate." FED. R. CRIM. P.
58(a)(2).
84. See City of Monroe v. Wilhite, 233 So. 2d 535 (La. 1970); People v. Foy, 636 N.Y.S.2d 559
(App. Div. 1995).
85. Wilhite, 233 So. 2d at 536.
86. Foy, 636 N.Y.S.2d at 559. However, after Codispoti was decided, the Louisiana Supreme
Court overruled Wilhite, because of the ruling in Codispoti, in State v. McCarrol, 337 So. 2d 475,
480 (La. 1976). Therefore, New York was the only jurisdiction supporting the Second Circuit
when the Supreme Court decided Lewis.
87. In Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), the Supreme Court reversed a decision
where the state of Louisiana tried a defendant without a jury on a charge of battery, which was
punishable by up to two years imprisonment. Id. at 160. The Court stated that Louisiana was
the only state in which crimes subject to trial without a jury are punishable by more than one
year in jail. Id. at 161 n.33. In Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970), the Court reversed a
conviction for "jostling," a crime punishable in New York by one year in prison, because the
accused was denied a jury trial. Id. at 67-68. The Court stated that New York was the lone
jurisdiction in the nation that denied an accused facing potential imprisonment of greater than
six months the right to trial by jury. Id. at 71-72.
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accorded the right of trial by a jury of his peers. The decision in Lewis
presented the first serious departure from this standard.
A. Just the Facts (and Procedural History)
In 1994, Ray Lewis, a postal worker, was charged with two counts of
obstructing the mail, in violation of Section 1701 of the United States
Code.88 Both counts were petty offenses, under the Supreme Court's
Baldwin standard, each punishable by a maximum sentence of six
months imprisonment. 89 When the government moved to have Lewis
tried without a jury, the magistrate granted the motion, stating that
she had already decided that regardless of the court's finding as to his
guilt on the charges, she would not sentence Lewis to more than six
months imprisonment.90 Lewis was convicted on both counts and was
sentenced to three years probation on each count, with the sentences
to run concurrently. 91
Following his conviction, the defendant appealed the denial of a
jury trial to the district court.92 The district court affirmed the magis-
trate's decision, stating that the right to a jury trial was determined by
the severity of the sentence for each individual charge, without regard
to the aggregate of the potential sentences. 93
Lewis appealed this decision to the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit.94 The Second Circuit reviewed the Supreme Court decisions
on the right to a jury trial and then examined treatment of the issue of
multiple petty offenses and the right to a jury trial by other courts.95
The opinion stated, "those courts which have addressed this question
to date are in agreement that potential sentences must be aggregated
to determine the right to a jury trial. '96
88. Lewis v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 2163, 2165 (1996). Section 1701 states: "Whoever know-
ingly and willfully obstructs or retards the passage of the mail, or any carrier or conveyance
carrying the mail, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than six months, or
both." 18 U.S.C. § 1701 (1994). For a discussion of whether the charges against Lewis, as federal
crimes, should receive different treatment by the courts on the petty offense exception, see
Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra note 20.
89. Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 2165; see supra Part I for the Baldwin standard.
90. Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 2165. This is the limited aggregation approach embraced by some
lower courts confronted with the issue of multiple petty offenses. See supra note 82.
91. United States v. Lewis, 65 F.3d 252, 253 (2nd Cir. 1995).
92. Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 2166. Lewis had argued to the district court that because the aggregate
maximum potential exceeded six months, his request for jury trial had been improperly denied
by the magistrate. Lewis, 65 F.3d at 253.
93. Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 2166.
94. Id.
95. Lewis, 65 F.3d at 254.
96. Id (citing decisions from three different circuit courts and district courts of four different
states). The Second Circuit cited: United States v. Coppins, 953 F.2d 86, 90 (4th Cir. 1991);
1997]
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Despite this unanimous approach by other courts, the Second Cir-
cuit decided to reject this approach. It held that the proper focus was
on the objective standard of the legislative determination, as in-
structed by Supreme Court precedent, and for that reason, potential
sentences should not be aggregated in order to make multiple petty
offenses warrant a jury trial.97 The decision of the district court was
affirmed. 98 As to the government's contention that, aggregation
notwithstanding, the defendant was not entitled to a jury trial because
of the magistrate's pre-trial promise of leniency in sentencing, the
court said that "self-imposed limitations on sentencing by the court
cannot deprive a defendant of his constitutionally protected right to a
jury trial."99 The defendant appealed to the Supreme Court, which
granted certiorari in order to resolve what it termed a "conflict in the
Courts of Appeals .... 11100
B. The Majority Speaks
Justice O'Connor delivered the majority opinion.10 1 She found that
the following two issues faced the Court in this case: 1) Does a de-
United States v. Bencheck, 926 F.2d 1512, 1518 (10th Cir. 1991); Rife v. Godbehere, 814 F.2d
563, 565 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Musgrave, 695 F. Supp. 231, 233 (W.D. Va. 1988);
United States v. O'Connor, 660 F. Supp. 955, 956 (N.D. Ga. 1987); United States v. Coleman,
664 F. Supp. 548, 549 (D.D.C. 1985); United States v. FMC Corp., 428 F. Supp. 615, 620
(W.D.N.Y. 1977). The fact that the Second Circuit did not even consider the few courts that
have held similarly to their position in Lewis renders their decision that much more ill-advised.
97. Lewis, 65 F.3d at 254. The Second Circuit, in focusing on objective criteria, stated that the
previous courts to consider this issue focused instead on the viewpoint of the defendant as to the
seriousness of facing greater than six months imprisonment for aggregate sentences. See infra
Part III.B.1 for a discussion of why the court's reasoning fails.
98. Lewis, 65 F.3d at 256.
99. Id. at 255-56. The Second Circuit stated, "while we need not resolve this question, in light
of the discussion above it is clear that" the pre-trial determination cannot stand. Id. at 255. The
majority opinion in Lewis stated that this language by the Second Circuit was dicta. Lewis, 116
S.Ct. at 2164. As will be seen, the Supreme Court offers no guidance on this issue either.
100. Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 2166. In giving this reason for their grant of certiorari, the Court
cited Coppins, Bencheck and Rife. Id. While these decisions vary in the approach taken, they all
reject the conclusion reached by the Second Circuit in Lewis, that a defendant can be sentenced
to greater than six months imprisonment for multiple petty offenses in one proceeding, without
benefit of a jury trial. See generally Coppins, 953 F.2d 86 (holding that an actual sentence of less
than six months did not preclude a jury trial where a potential aggregate of multiple petty of-
fenses was greater than six months); Bencheck, 926 F.2d 1512 (requiring no jury trial if the trial
judge predetermines that the sentence will be no more than six months); Rife, 814 F.2d 563
(holding that where the defendant actually faced less than six months in prison, a jury trial was
not required).
101. Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 2165. Justice O'Connor's opinion carried a bare majority of five
justices. She was joined by Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia, Souter, and Thomas, JJ. Id. Justice Kennedy
composed a concurring opinion, which was joined by Justice Breyer. Id. at 2169 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). Justice Stevens wrote in dissent, joined by Justice Ginsburg. Id. at 2173 (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
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fendant prosecuted in a single proceeding for multiple petty offenses
have a constitutional right to a jury trial where the aggregate prison
term authorized for the offenses exceeds six months? and 2) Can a
defendant, who otherwise has a right to a jury trial, be denied that
right when the magistrate makes a pre-trial finding that the aggregate
sentence will not exceed six months imprisonment? 1° Writing for the
majority, Justice O'Connor stated at the outset that because the ma-
jority had decided that no right to a jury trial exists for a defendant
facing a sentence for multiple petty offenses, the Court would not
reach the issue of whether judicial pre-trial sentencing parameters can
affect the right to a jury trial.10 3
The majority began with a summary of the facts and procedural his-
tory of the case. 1' 4 Then, the Court reviewed the relevant precedent,
stating: that petty offenses are not within the scope of the Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial; that the court has sought objective
indications of the seriousness with which society regards the offenses;
and that the maximum penalty authorized by statute for an offense is
the proper standard for that determination. 0 5 The majority rein-
forced the presumption that an offense punishable by imprisonment
of six months or less is petty in nature and bears no jury-trial right.10 6
The majority held that the fact that a defendant faces multiple
charges and a potential prison sentence of greater than six months
does not invoke a right to trial by jury when none of the charged of-
fenses would give such a right individually. 0 7 Lewis was charged with
obstructing the mail, an offense punishable by six months imprison-
102. Id. at 2165.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 2165-66. The opinion stated that Lewis was observed pocketing mail on two occa-
sions but it is unclear if Lewis was charged for two distinct acts at different times or for two acts
arising out of the same occurrence. This issue was also not addressed by the lower courts. It is
not immediately relevant, for the Supreme Court makes no consideration of it in its reasoning.
However, some courts that have addressed the issue of aggregation of potential sentences ex-
pressely state that aggregation is allowed for multiple petty offenses arising from the same trans-
action or occurrence. Compare State v. Owens, 254 A.2d 97, 102 (N.J. 1969) (allowing for
aggregation of multiple petty offenses arising out of a single event), with People v. Foy, 636
N.Y.S.2d 559, 562 (App. Div. 1995) (denying aggregation of potential sentences to a defendant
charged with multiple petty offenses arising from the same incident because New York Penal
Law requires concurrent sentences for multiple convictions arising from a single incident).
105. Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 2166; see supra Part I for a discussion of the precedents cited by the
Court here.
106. Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 2166-67.
107. Id. at 2167. The Court was implying that if one of the multiple counts were for a serious
offense, a jury trial would be awarded. This is a common theme among those courts that reject
aggregation. See supra notes 69-70. The Court failed to answer Lewis' argument that this focus
on the nature of the offense should properly result in an impractical result for a defendant who is
tried jointly for a petty and a serious offense. Such a defendant should receive a jury verdict on
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ment.10 8 By setting that maximum sentence, the legislature demon-
strated that it considered this to be a petty offense.'0 9 The fact that
Lewis was charged with two such offenses did not change the fact that
the legislature considered obstructing the mail to be a petty offense. 10
According to the majority, multiple charges do not transform the na-
ture of the offense from petty to serious:"' "Where we have a judg-
ment by the legislature that an offense is 'petty', we do not look to the
potential prison term faced by a particular defendant who is charged
with more than one such petty offense.""12
The majority rejected Lewis' claim that the holding in Codispoti113
required a finding that he had a right to a jury trial. 14 Codispoti is
distinguishable from Lewis, the Court found, because in Codispoti the
defendants were charged with criminal contempt, for which there was
no legislatively determined maximum penalty. 1 5 In such a case, the
court looks to the sentence actually imposed by the lower court in
determining the right to a jury trial.116 Further, special considerations
as to judicial propriety in the contempt context warrant the neutrality
of a jury.117 Therefore, the Court held that the charges in Codispoti
the serious offense and a judicial determination on the petty offense. Petitioner's Reply Brief at
5-6, Lewis v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 2163 (1996) (No. 95-6465) (1996 WL 191055).
108. Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 2165.
109. Id. at 2167.
110. Id.
111. Id. Lewis argued to the Court that the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury attaches to
the prosecution as a whole and not to any one offense. Petitioner's Reply Brief at 1, Lewis (No.
95-6465). This argument was embraced by the dissent. Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 2173 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
112. Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 2167. The Court focused on the desire for an objective determination
of seriousness, which is what led to the use of legislative determination in the first place. Id. at
2166. However, the Court here is incorrectly viewing aggregation as a subjective focus on a
particular defendant. Lewis represents an entire class of defendants who face a single prosecu-
tion for multiple petty offenses. Looking at the potential sentence for multiple petty offenses is
no less objective than doing so for one. The legislature does not pass a law and name a certain
offense petty or serious. The Court should look at the maximum sentence available for the
charged offense and label it petty or serious according to the Baldwin standard. It could just as
easily do so for two or more offenses. Aggregation is not a break from the traditional desire for
objective means. However; the Court's mistake is a common one. See Lewis v. United States, 65
F.3d 252, 254 (2nd. Cir. 1995); Jeff E. Butler, Petty Offenses, Serious Consequences: Multiple
Petty Offenses and the Sixth Amendment Right to Jury Trial, 94 MIcH. L. REV. 872, 875 (1995)
(arguing that aggregation focuses on individual defendants, which violates the principle that
community preferences should dictate the seriousness of the offense).
113. 418 U.S. 506 (1974).
114. Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 2167.
115. Id. at 2167-68.
116. Id. at 2168.
117. Id. The Court's mention of this concern over judicial impropriety in contempt cases
seems misplaced in a discussion of the decision to aggregate. If the fear of judicial misconduct
was so great, it seems Codispoti would have received a jury trial without the necessity of aggre-
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were properly aggregated. 118 By comparison, the majority looked to
Taylor where no jury trial was required because the sentence actually
imposed for the multiple criminal contempts was less than six
months. 119
Finally, the majority pointed to the fact that even if Lewis had a
right to a jury trial due to the aggregation of his potential sentences,
the government would have had the authority to bypass the jury trial
right by prosecuting the petitioner for the two charges separately.120
The Court seemed to think that this makes Lewis' argument moot be-
cause one prosecution for both offenses carries no greater burden for
the defendant than does two prosecutions for one count each.' 2'
C. Justice Kennedy Agrees, Sort Of
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Breyer, concurred with the ma-
jority in affirming the decision of the Circuit Court.122 The stance of
the concurring opinion, however, was drastically at odds with the ma-
jority opinion. The concurrence disagreed with the majority on the
issue of whether multiple petty offenses should be aggregated for pur-
poses of a jury trial, affirming instead on the issue not reached by the
majority, that of pre-trial determination of maximum sentence. 123 Be-
cause it was settled from the outset that Lewis could not be sentenced
to more than six months imprisonment for the combined petty of-
fenses, Justice Kennedy wrote at the start of his concurrence that
Lewis never had a right to a trial by jury. 124 The rest of the opinion,
however, attacked the majority's decision. 25
gation of the sentences imposed. Further, in Taylor, which also concerned criminal contempt,
the fear of judicial misconduct failed to necessitate a jury trial when the aggregate imposed
sentences did not exceed six months imprisonment. See infra Part III.B.2 for a discussion of the
value of Codispoti and Taylor as precedents for the majority decision in Lewis.
118. Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 2168.
119. Id.
120. Id. But see Christine E. Pardo, Multiple Petty Offenses with Serious Penalties: A Case for
the Right to Trial by Jury, 23 FORDHAM Ua. L.J. 895, 922 & n.150 (1996) (arguing that the trial
judge should require joinder when related charges are severed in bad faith). The author also
cites the MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.3(2), which states that a defendant shall not be subject to
separate trials for multiple offenses based on the same conduct or incident. I&.
121. Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 2168.
122. Id. at 2169 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
123. Id. In fact, Justice Kennedy's concurrence was completely at odds with that of the Sec-
ond Circuit. Kennedy argued that the multiple counts should have been aggregated but that
there was no right to jury trial because of the magistrate's pre-trial determination. Id. The
Second Circuit held that the pre-trial determination was unconstitutional but that there was no
right to jury trial because aggregation of the potential sentences was not proper. United States
v. Lewis, 65 F.3d 252, 255-56 (2nd Cir. 1995).
124. Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 2169.
125. Id.
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The concurrence examined the Codispoti and Taylor decisions and
found that they established the proposition that the right to a trial by
jury exists for any defendant sentenced to greater than six months im-
prisonment in one proceeding. 126 If multiple petty offenses threaten a
defendant with greater than six months imprisonment, "taken to-
gether, the crimes then are considered serious for constitutional pur-
poses, even if each is petty by itself.' 27 The concurrence rejected the
majority's claim that these cases are distinguishable because their
holdings rested on the absence of legislative determinations of maxi-
mum penalties. 28 The absence of statutory maximum penalty, Justice
Kennedy wrote, has nothing to do with the decision of the Court in
Codispoti to award the jury trial.129 The only effect it had was to cause
the Court to look at the penalty actually imposed. 30 Justice Kennedy
finds support for this assertion in Taylor, in which the defendant,
charged with the same type of offense, was given no right to jury trial
because the aggregate penalty facing him was not greater than six
months.' 3'
Aside from these precedents, Justice Kennedy based his opinion on
more basic grounds. He looked to the purpose of the jury trial-to
protect the accused from improper use of the power of the state. 32
Justice Kennedy understood this fear of state power to be a concern
anytime a single judge sentences a defendant to greater than six
months imprisonment.133 This is so whether the sentence is the result
of conviction on one serious offense or several petty ones. 134 Justice
Kennedy rejected the majority's implication that a defendant without
a right to jury trial, facing separate prosecutions, faces no greater
threat of tyranny by the state than does one facing a single prosecu-
tion on several counts. 35 Justice Kennedy was confident that there is
adequate protection for the defendant who is tried individually on
each count because the witnesses and the prosecution's theory of the
case will be tested repeatedly and because the defendant may be tried
by different judges or will benefit from collateral estoppel in his later
trials. 136
126. Id. at 2169-70.
127. Id. at 2169.
128. Id. at 2170.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 2171.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 2171-72.
136. Id.
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D. Justice Stevens Dissents
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg, dissented from the ma-
jority opinion. 137 The dissent disagreed with both the majority and
concurrence on their alternate theories for affirming the appellate
court decision. Justice Stevens, writing for the dissent, agreed with the
concurrence that the potential sentences of multiple petty offenses
charged in one proceeding should be aggregated in determining the
right to a jury trial.138 Justice Stevens looked to the language of the
Sixth Amendment, which refers to "criminal prosecutions," to support
his position that the objective determination of the penalty authorized
by statute should be measured by the sentence authorized for the en-
tire prosecution, not any specific charge within the prosecution.139 He
explained that the use of "offense" rather than "prosecution" in past
Supreme Court cases was due to the fact that those prior cases dealt
with prosecutions for only one offense and so, according to the dis-
sent, the terms "offense" and "prosecution" were interchangeable. 40
The dissent disagreed with the majority's reading of Codispoti.'4'
While the majority distinguished that case because it dealt with crimi-
nal contempt, Justice Stevens argued that the unique nature of crimi-
nal contempt prosecutions (the absence of statutory maximum
penalty) is not relevant to the question of aggregation. 42 This specific
element is of significance only in determining whether the reviewing
court must look to a subjective standard, namely the sentence im-
posed, when there is no objective standard to guide them.143 The dis-
sent noted that since the defendants in Codispoti were given no
individual sentence of greater than six months, the holding of the ma-
jority in Lewis would require a finding that no jury trial was necessary
for the Codispoti defendants. 44 That implied result is at odds with the
actual decision.' 45 The Court held in Codispoti that the defendants
were in fact entitled to a trial by jury.' 46
137. Id. at 2173 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
138. Id. Stevens argued that the majority took a rule fashioned solely by cases involving sin-
gle offenses and blindly applied it to the dissimilar circumstances of multiple petty offenses. Id.;
see supra note 107 (showing that Petitioner's Reply Brief contains the same argument).
139. Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 2173 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. (citing Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 517 (1974)).
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The dissent also disagreed with the concurrence's analysis of the
second issue brought by Lewis-can a judge make a pre-trial promise
of a limited sentence, thus thwarting the jury-trial right of the ac-
cused? 147 Justice Kennedy reasoned for the concurrence that Taylor
supported such a power of the trial judge. 148 The dissent argued that,
since a judge could not strip the right to a jury trial in a prosecution
for a serious offense, no such license should be given when the prose-
cution is for multiple petty offenses. 149 The "opprobrium" that at-
taches in each instance is the same.150 Justice Stevens argued that the
right to a jury trial attaches at the moment of prosecution and, there-
fore, no such pre-trial decision can affect that right.151
III. ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM OF LEWIS
This Part of the Note provides criticism of the majority decision, as
well as a discussion of the merits of the concurrence and the dissent.
Section A will briefly discuss the issue of judicial pre-trial determina-
tion. Section B will scrutinize the Court's decision, using Justice
McReynold's quote from Clawans as a guide.'52 Section C will criti-
cize the Court for ignoring the overwhelming rejection by the lower
courts of the approach taken by the majority.
A. The Question of Pre-trial Determinations
Because the Court decided that there should be no aggregation of
the potential penalties facing Lewis, and therefore there was no right
to a jury trial, the majority did not reach the issue of whether the
magistrate could properly void a defendant's right to a jury trial by
vowing before the trial that the total sentence for the multiple petty
offenses would not exceed six months.
While the majority did not reach this issue, the concurrence and
dissent did. Justice Kennedy based his affirmance of the appellate
court decision on his view that the magistrate acted properly in mak-
147. Id. at 2172.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 2174.
150. id. The majority disagreed with this argument, stating that the fact that Lewis was tried
for two offenses does not "transform the petty offense into a serious one .. " Id. at 2167. The
Second Circuit stated the same in its decision. United Stated v. Lewis, 65 F.3d 252, 253-54 (2nd
Cir. 1995). The legislative maximum sentence was chosen as a reflection of the community's
judgements. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 160 (1968). Thus, the majority and the Second
Circuit are putting themselves in the seemingly indefensible position of saying that the commu-
nity regards two offenses as no more objectionable than one.
151. Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 2174 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
152. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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ing a pre-trial promise not to sentence Lewis to greater than six
months in jail, effectively voiding the right to a jury trial given by the
multiple petty offenses. 153 Justice Stevens in his dissent disagreed, ar-
guing that the jury trial right attaches at the moment of prosecution
and cannot be affected by any pre-trial judicial promise. 154 When the
Second Circuit decided that Lewis had no right to a jury trial, the
court expressly rejected the claim that the magistrate's assurance of
less than six months imprisonment could overcome the right to jury
trial even if aggregation of the sentences was allowed. 55 "Self-im-
posed limitations on sentencing by the Court cannot deprive a defend-
ant of his constitutionally protected right to a jury trial."'1 56 However,
the Second Circuit noted that the Tenth Circuit had ruled differ-
ently.' 57 In United States v. Bencheck, 58 the Tenth Circuit held that
when a judge determines that upon conviction for multiple petty of-
fenses the sentence would be no more than six months imprisonment,
there is no right to trial by jury.' 59
There are numerous justifications given for allowing such a pre-trial
statement to determine whether the defendant has a right to a jury
trial. The Tenth Circuit argued in Bencheck that the Federal Rules for
Criminal Procedure supported its approach:
[T]he trial judge is free to announce before trial how the sentence
will be limited in the event of conviction, and then may determine
based on that announcement whether to use the Rules. The same
logic applies here, where the trial judge announced that the sen-
tence, in the event of conviction, would be no more than six months'
[sic] incarceration and because of that limitation no jury was consti-
tutionally required.' 60
This logic seems flawed, however, for the procedure allowed under
the Federal Rules is being transferred over to a case where its applica-
tion could infringe upon constitutional rights. It is questionable
whether judges can override the use of the Constitution as easily as
they can the use of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
The court in Bencheck also found support for its approach in Taylor
v. Hayes,161 where it is said that the state may try a criminal contempt
prosecution without a jury "where ... the state 'determines not to
153. Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 2169 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
154. Id. at 2174 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
155. United States v. Lewis, 65 F.3d 252, 255 (2nd Cir. 1995).
156. Id. at 256.
157. Id.
158. 926 F.2d 1512 (10th Cir. 1991).
159. Id. at 1519.
160. Id.
161. 418 U.S. 488 (1974).
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impose a sentence longer than six months.'" 162 This language seems
too ambiguous to support the approach taken in Bencheck. The
Court's statement in Taylor likely meant only that when the sentence
actually given by the judge is less than six months, there is no right to
a jury trial. That was the thrust of the Taylor decision and nowhere in
its criminal contempt precedents does the Court advocate the use of
pre-trial sentence limitations to decide the issue of a jury trial right.
This is clear by the fact that none of the opinions in Lewis cite any
precedent for such a proposition and that the majority feels it should
not even reach the issue.163 The court in Bencheck seems to be twist-
ing language, which is ambiguous standing alone, to fit its needs.
Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in Lewis argues for the use of
pre-trial statements by the judge in deciding on the right to trial by
jury.164 Justice Kennedy cites the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure for support but he looks to Supreme Court precedent as well. 165
He claims that the Court approved such a practice in Scott v. Illi-
nois,166 in which the court ruled that a judge is not required by the
Sixth Amendment to appoint an attorney for an accused in a misde-
meanor case if the judge will not sentence him to any jail time. 67
Once again, this seems to be an inappropriate judicial extension of
precedent, though not as erroneous as that in Bencheck. The decision
in Scott was for a case where the defendant faced no jail time.168
Supreme Court precedent impliedly holds that there is a great differ-
ence in severity between a penalty involving no jail time and one in-
volving six months incarceration. 69 The situation in Lewis was far
more serious than that which faced the defendant in Scott.
These arguments for the pre-trial sentence propositions notwith-
standing, it seems that allowing the judge to make these decisions
before even hearing the evidence of the case goes against public pol-
icy. This public policy view holds that such judicial decisions may be
improperly lenient to criminal defendants. Allowing a judge to state
before trial that a sentence will be limited in some way precludes the
162. Bencheck, 926 F.2d at 1519 (citing Taylor, 418 U.S. at 496).
163. Lewis v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 2163, 2172 (1996).
164. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
165. Id.
166. 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
167. Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 2172 (citing Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979)).
168. Scott, 440 U.S. at 374.
169, See generally Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970) (holding that a defendant sen-
tenced to one year in prison was entitled to a jury trial);.Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145
(1968) (holding that a sentence of two years required a jury trial); District of Columbia v.
Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (1937) (holding that a defendant sentenced to only 60 days in jail did not
require a jury trial).
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possibility that evidence heard at trial, that would convince the judge
that the maximum sentence is warranted, will be given its proper ef-
fect. Once judges promise to limit sentences, they are bound to those
vows and criminal defendants may escape their deserved punishments.
Granted, since this only applies to petty offenses, this procedure
would obviously not result in murderers going free prematurely. Nev-
ertheless, it is an age-old adage that the penalty should fit the crime.
How can the proper penalty be determined before the judge has heard
the specifics of the crime charged at trial?
Despite the arguments made against the use of pre-trial sentencing
determinations, this practice should be allowed to continue for it fits
with the main argument against the decision in Lewis: no criminal
defendant should be ultimately sentenced to greater than six months
without being afforded the opportunity to be tried by a jury. For that
reason, it is unobjectionable, absent a Supreme Court ruling against
the use of this approach, to allow this approach to stand for the pur-
pose of states' experimentation.
B. The Court Rejects the Lessons of Justice McReynolds
In a separate opinion in the Supreme Court case of District of Co-
lumbia v. Clawans,170 in which the Court first looked to a statutory
maximum penalty in deciding the right to a jury trial, Justice McReyn-
olds stated, "[c]onstitutional guarantees ought not to be subordinated
to convenience, nor denied upon questionable precedents or uncertain
reasoning.' 171 This is a fundamental view of the role of the Supreme
Court as interpreter of the Constitution. Though Justice McReynolds'
statement was not part of a majority opinion, it is without question an
argument that would face little challenge. This remark stands as an
excellent framework for the analysis of the majority's decision in
Lewis, for that opinion clearly violated all three of Justice McReyn-
olds' cautionary instructions.
1. The Erroneous Reasoning of the Court
The majority holding in Lewis is not based upon sound reasoning.
The Court blindly followed the letter of a standard laid out in prior
cases and ignored the reasoning and logic that led to the adoption of
the standard in the first place. The primary focus of the entire Consti-
tution is the protection of the individual from improper exercise of
state power. The Sixth Amendment guarantee of the right to trial by
170. 300 U.S. 617 (1937).
171. Id. at 634.
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jury is paramount to this protection, for the ability to label a person a
"criminal" and deprive that individual of liberty is one of the most
dangerous powers of the state, if used improperly. The right to trial
by jury has consistently been viewed by the courts as one of the most
important protections for the individual. 172 As stated at the beginning
of this Note: "Providing an accused with the right to be tried by a jury
of his peers gave him an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or
overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric
judge."173
At common law, there has always been a group of offenses for
which the right of jury trial was exempt.'7 4 The Supreme Court has
labeled these "petty offenses" and they are generally those offenses
which carry lower infringement of liberties for the convicted defend-
ant. 75 The basis for the differential treatment of this group of of-
fenses is that the penalty faced by the defendant, even if the system
fails, is not so great. The Court stated that "the possible consequences
to defendants from convictions for petty offenses have been thought
insufficient to outweigh the benefits to... simplified judicial adminis-
tration resulting from ... nonjury adjudications."'1 76 The ordinary fear
of oppression by the state was not so great because the penalty to the
individual, while not negligible, was not unbearable given the benefit
to the system. 77
In its decisions in Baldwin, Duncan, and Clawans, the Supreme
Court reaffirmed the idea that some offenses, because of the relatively
minimal intrusion on the liberty interests of the individual, fall outside
of Sixth Amendment considerations. 7 8 The Court used these opin-
ions to try to set a standard for determining which offenses are petty,
therefore giving no right to a jury trial, and which are serious, accord-
ing the accused full Sixth Amendment rights.179
In Clawans, the Court rejected the approach of simply looking to
whether the charged offense was indictable at common law. 180 Things
had changed significantly since the time of the drafting of the Consti-
tution and some crimes were viewed differently and punished more or
172. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 156; see supra text accompanying note 1.
173. Supra note 172.
174. Clawans, 300 U.S. at 624.
175. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 159-60.
176. Id. at 160.
177. Id.
178. See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 68 (1970); Duncan, 391 U.S. at 159; Clawans, 300
U.S. at 624-25.
179. Supra note 178.
180. Clawans, 300 U.S. at 625.
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less strictly.181 Therefore, a court could not merely say, for example,
that one charged with assault cannot have a jury trial because one
hundred years ago the courts at common law did not give such an
accused a jury trial, if the penalty for such an offense had changed
from three months at common law to one year under the state stat-
utes. The Court stated in Clawans that some consideration needs to
be given to the maximum penalty authorized by statute.182
The Court continued this trend in Duncan, which called for the use
of the statutory maximum penalty as the primary focus in determining
whether an offense is petty or serious.' 83 The Court wished to have an
objective standard to guide the lower courts in this area and it felt that
the decision of the legislature, expressing the feelings of the people as
to the seriousness of the offense, is the best indicator.184
It is important to understand the steps in logic taken by the Court in
making this decision. The jury trial exists to protect the accused.
When the penalty faced by the accused is minimal that right is not
necessary but for more serious penalties the right is inviolate. The
Court merely labels these petty or serious for convenience. The focus
on the legislative penalty allows the courts to regard an offense as
"petty" or "serious," rather than merely calling a sentence minor or
major.
That was the approach used by the courts at common law.' 85 The
defendant's right to a jury trial depended on the penalty accompany-
ing the charge.186 The Court is merely continuing that tradition, look-
ing to the authorized penalty for an offense to determine whether that
offense will be considered a petty or a serious offense. The Court is
focusing on the objective determination by the legislature of what
type of penalty will be placed on one guilty of a certain offense.
The focus throughout this opinion was on how much jail time a de-
fendant can face in a prosecution without being granted the right of a
jury trial. The standard announced by the Court in Duncan essentially
asked if the offense was petty or serious, as determined by the legisla-
ture's penalty determination. 87 The logic behind such a standard
would seem to be saying that we do not want an individual to be faced
181. Id. at 627.
182. Id. at 625.
183. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 159.
184. Baldwin, 399 U.S. at 68.
185. See Clawans, 300 U.S. at 624-25.
186. Baldwin, 399 U.S. at 68-70.
187. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 160.
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with too much jail time without being accorded the right guaranteed
by the Sixth Amendment.
In Baldwin, the Court came closer to setting the dividing line be-
tween serious and petty at six months imprisonment. Again, the
Court called for the use of the objective standard of statutory maxi-
mum penalty as the method for determining when the penalty facing
the accused is sufficient enough to warrant a jury trial.'88 Perhaps the
most telling element of the Clawans, Duncan, and Baldwin decisions
is that in each one the Supreme Court underwent a detailed analysis
of the right to trial by jury, its purpose of protecting the individual
from the tyranny of the state and the need for that right when a crimi-
nal charge threatens one with a major infringement of one's liberty. 189
After this standard was declared however, the Court began looking
exclusively at what label applies to a given offense, petty or serious,
seemingly forgetting why the standard was applied in the first place
and failing to see if the original reasoning behind the standard would
bear out the result in the new situation. After Baldwin, the Court no
longer examined in detail the purpose behind the right to jury trial
and the reason why the legislative determination of maximum penalty
was adopted as the standard.190
The decision announced by the Court in Lewis shows that the Court
has turned its back on the reasoning behind the differential treatment
of petty and serious crimes. The majority rigidly applied the test of
Baldwin, looking at the statutory maximum penalty for obstruction of
the mail, determining that obstruction of the mail is a petty crime and
effectively ending the analysis right there.' 9' However, the term
188. Baldwin, 399 U.S. at 68. The Tenth Circuit has argued that aggregation is the best objec-
tive standard. See Haar v. Hanrahan, 708 F.2d 1547, 1552 (10th Cir. 1983) ("The aggregate of the
statutorily prescribed penalties provides the objective indicia of the opprobrium that society
attaches to the entire criminal act and is thus the appropriate measure of the act's seriousness").
189. Baldwin, 399 U.S. at 68-73; Duncan, 319 U.S. at 153-61; Clawans, 300 U.S. at 624-30.
190. See Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506 (1974); Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488 (1974).
191. Lewis v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 2163, 2167 (1996). There is evidence that the legisla-
ture is more inclined toward aggregation than the Court. Title 18, Section 3584(c) of the United
States Code states that "[m]ultiple terms of imprisonment ordered to run consecutively or con-
currently shall be treated for administrative purposes as a single, aggregate term of imprison-
ment." 18 U.S.C. § 3584(c) (1994). This attitude from Congress is especially important given the
emphasis the Court places on deference to the legislative judgement in this area. See CAL. PE-
NAL CODE § 1203a (West 1982) (stating a similar approach by a state legislature). The Tenth
Circuit has viewed aggregation of potential sentences as a much more flexible, and proper, ap-
proach to this issue. Haar, 708 F.2d at 1552. In Haar, the court stated that "aggrega[tion] of the
statutorily prescribed penalties imparts a pragmatic temper to the Supreme Court's concept of a
'serious offense'.... [T]he approach comports with both the realities of multiple-crime charging
and the language of the Sixth Amendment, which guarantees the right to a jury trial in the
context of 'criminal prosecutions."' Id.
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"petty" is not the test itself but merely a convenient label placed on a
type of crime by the court. The legislature did not determine that this
was a petty offense. It merely decided that the maximum penalty im-
posable for one count of obstructing the mail is six months
imprisonment. 192
The true test that the Court needs to apply here is whether the po-
tential penalty faced by this defendant in this prosecution is so great
as to arouse the fears of the people against judicial or prosecutorial
misconduct. Granted, the Court wants an objective standard and will
not look at the special circumstances facing each defendant. How-
ever, the situation faced by Lewis-charges of multiple petty offenses
in one proceeding-was different than any considered by the Court
when it set the standard in Duncan. In this new situation, the Court
should not merely stick rigidly to its standard. It should go back to the
reasoning behind the standard and the purpose for the jury trial in the
first place to see if a new approach is warranted by the circumstances.
The Court failed entirely to use this approach. The majority opin-
ion in Lewis at no time reviewed the basis behind its standard. It
merely held that the charged offenses were petty and declared out-
right that the numerous offenses in no way combined to form a serious
offense. 193 The question it should have asked is whether the multiple
offenses charged against Lewis threatened him with a sentence of such
severity that the danger of impropriety by the State became a concern,
thus warranting a jury trial.
The majority stated that if the defendant had a right to a jury trial in
this prosecution, then the government could bypass that right by
charging the counts separately. 194 The majority seemed to think that
under such separate charging of offenses, the defendant would be in
the same position, under the same danger of tyranny by the state, as
192. 18 U.S.C. § 1701 (1994). Cf Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 2167 (stating that "[w]here we have a
judgment by the legislature that an offense is 'petty,' we do not look to the potential prison term
faced by a particular defendant" (emphasis in original)). The Court seems to be transferring the
determination of "petty" or "serious" and the corresponding decision as to jury trial, from the
judiciary to the legislature. However, the legislature simply makes the penalty determination.
The courts use that to label an offense petty or serious and they carry the burden of evaluating
the efficacy of the standard in all situations. They cannot simply wash their hands of meaningful
scrutiny, as the Supreme Court is attempting to do here.
193. Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 2167.
194. Id. at 2168. The Court's language here implies that the justices see no harm to defend-
ants from this decision. Others have similarly argued that these issues are mere procedural alter-
natives. See City of Monroe v. Wilhite, 233 So. 2d 535, 536 (La. 1970) (holding that consolidation
for trial is merely a procedural device which has no effect upon the right to jury trial); Peti-
tioner's Reply Brief at 10, Lewis v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 2163 (1996) (No. 95-6465) (1996 WL
191055) (denouncing the government's claim that the choice between a jury trial and a non-jury
trial is merely an issue of procedural alternatives).
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he is under the majority's ruling in Lewis. This is erroneous. The
right to trial by jury is aimed at protection not from the system as a
whole, so much as it is aimed at protection from the arbitrary deci-
sions of a judge or the actions of a prosecutor in a specific case. It
does not matter that "the system" would be able to convict the de-
fendant on both counts without a jury trial. What matters, and what a
defendant fears, is that one judge or one prosecutor could punish him
for both sentences.
As Justice Kennedy states in his Lewis concurrence, separate trials
for individual counts would provide defendants with several added
safeguards: possibly different judges or prosecutors would hear the
individual counts; the charges might be heard on different days, so the
mood of the courtroom players on any specific day would not deter-
mine the petitioner's fate; the strength of the prosecutor's case and
the probative value of witnesses and evidence would be tested more
than once.195 Thus, the majority cannot escape the issue merely by
saying that the right to a jury trial could be avoided anyway.
Even if one ignores the central purpose behind the Sixth Amend-
ment right to a jury trial, as the Court has done here, its reasoning in
denying Lewis his jury trial is in error. As noted, the majority rigidly
looked to the legislative determination of the maximum sentence in
deciding whether there is a right to a jury trial.196 The Court looked at
the statute criminalizing obstruction of the mail, found a maximum
sentence of six months imprisonment, and stopped there. 197 However,
the Court stopped looking too soon. Title 18, section 3584 of the
United States Code is entitled "Multiple sentences of imprison-
ment."' 98 In this section, Congress has decided that "if multiple terms
of imprisonment are imposed on a defendant at the same time.., the
terms may run concurrently or consecutively . ,,199 This is a clear
determination by the legislature, acting as a guage for the judgements
195. Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 2171-72.
196. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
197. Id.
198. 18 U.S.C. § 3584 (1994).
199. Id. § 3584(a). The Second Circuit, in its decision in Lewis, actually cited this section of
the Code as support for its decision. United States v. Lewis, 65 F.3d 252, 255 (2nd Cir. 1995).
That court cited the section of part (a) which states that if multiple sentences are imposed at one
time, they will run concurrently, unless the court orders otherwise. Id. The Second Circuit read
that to mean that Congress does not consider multiple petty offenses any more serious than a
single petty offense. Id. However, the fact that the legislature explicitly approved the use of
consecutive sentences for multiple petty offenses exhibits that multiple offenses are not the equal
of single offenses when tried jointly. Also, the fact that the court can overcome that presump-
tion and give consecutive sentences is of special relevance when the primary concern behind the
jury trial is the fear of judicial misconduct.
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of the people, that multiple offenses, be they petty or serious, can re-
sult in greater lengths of imprisonment than single offenses. There-
fore, under the Court's decisions dating back to Duncan, multiple
petty offenses are considered more serious by the legislature.
This type of legislation is not limited to the Federal Code. Most
states have similar sections in their codes. 2°° It is clear that even
under the Court's rigid application of the petty offense distinction,
Lewis deserved a jury trial. In Blanton, the Court said "[t]he judiciary
should not substitute its judgement ... for that of a legislature, which
is 'far better equipped to perform the task. .... ,,,201 By ignoring the
dictates of the United States Code as to multiple sentences, the Court
has done just that.
2. The Court Turns Its Back on Precedent
The majority's holding in Lewis fails to satisfy Justice McReynolds'
second precaution, for its decision is not supported by precedent. The
cases cited by the Court are questionable precedents for its decision.
In fact, precedent clearly compelled a different result. The Court in-
correctly distinguished its prior decisions and found no modern sup-
port for its holding in this case.
The only support the majority found for its position that a jury trial
is not a right of defendants who are charged with multiple petty of-
fenses is two common law English cases from the eighteenth cen-
tury.202 Clearly, this is questionable precedent for the Court's
decision. After making these archaic references, the majority went on
to a tortured and incorrect reading of the relevant, modern cases of
Taylor and Codispoti. The crime charged in these two cases, criminal
200. See Amiz. REV. STAT. § 13-708 (1996) (stating that multiple sentences imposed at one
time are presumed to run consecutively); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-403 (Michie 1995) (stating that
a court may order multiple sentences to run consecutively); CAL. PENAL CODE § 669 (West
1996) (stating that sentences can run consecutively); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-37 (1994) (stating
that the court decides whether multiple sentences are to run consecutively or concurrently); 730
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-8-4 (West 1996) (stating that multiple sentences imposed at the same time
may run concurrently or consecutively as the court orders).
201. Blanton v. North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 541 (1989) (citing Landry v. Hoepfner, 840
F.2d 1201, 1209 (5th Cir. 1988)). The majority in Lewis even quoted this passage before going on
to ignore its message by overruling the clear intent of the legislature. Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 2166.
202. Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 2167 (citing King v. Swallow, 101 Eng. Rep. 1392 (K.B. 1799); Queen
v. Matthews, 88 Eng. Rep. 609 (Q.B. 1712)). Lewis argued the merits of these precedents to the
Court in Petitioner's Reply Brief at n.1, Lewis v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 2163 (1996) (No. 95-
6465) (1996 WL 191055). Lewis claimed that the two English cases stood only for the joinder of
two petty offenses in a single proceeding and cited a contemporaneous case, The King v.
Salolom, 1 T.R. 249-252 (K.B. 1786), which held that two distinct charges could not be joined in
one conviction. Petitioner's Reply Brief at note 1, Lewis (No. 95-6465).
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contempt, carries no statutory maximum penalty,203 whereas the of-
fense charged in the present case had a legislative determination of
the maximum sentence. 20 The majority in effect hung its hat on this
factual difference between these cases, rather than applying the intent
of the earlier rulings.
The majority misplaced the proper focus with its analysis of the
criminal contempt cases. The fact that there was no statutory maxi-
mum penalty for criminal contempt was the reason why the court fo-
cused on the penalty actually assessed upon the defendants in Taylor
and Codispoti.20 5 In Lewis, since there was a maximum penalty au-
thorized by statute for the offense of obstructing the mail, the Court
focused on that potential sentence rather than the sentence actually
imposed.206 This difference in focus is the only disparate treatment
justified by this factual distinction between the cases. In determining
whether the defendants in Codispoti and Taylor were entitled to jury
trials, the Court aggregated the penalties faced by the defendants.20 7
In Taylor, the multiple sentences were for six months each, running
concurrently, and so the defendant ultimately faced no more than six
months imprisonment.20 8 Similarly, in Codispoti, the Court aggre-
gated the imposed sentences to a total of three years and three
months and held that the defendant was therefore entitled to a jury
trial.20 9 The Court so held despite the fact that no single count of
contempt was punished by greater than six months imprisonment. 210
As Justice Stevens stated in his dissent in Lewis, the application of
the majority's holding in Lewis to a factual situation identical to that
in Codispoti would require a finding that no jury trial is warranted-
the opposite of the Court's actual holding in Codispoti.211 The Court
has thus broken with precedent while claiming to follow it.
The factual difference in the presence or absence of a statutory
maximum sentence cannot explain the differential treatment accorded
203. Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 2167-68.
204. Id. at 2167.
205. Id. at 2167-68; see Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 511 (1974); Taylor v. Hayes,
418 U.S. 488, 495 (1974). Cf Codispoti, 418 U.S. at 516-17 (deciding to aggregate the sentences
and never mentioning the fact that the charged offenses carry no legislative maximum sentence).
The Court stated that the focus should be on the sentence actually imposed apparently due to
the absence of a maximum penalty. Id. However, the Court never again mentioned this absence
of authorized penalty as a basis for its holding. Id.
206. Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 2167.
207. Codispoti, 418 U.S. at 517; Taylor, 418 U.S. at 495-96.
208. Taylor, 418 U.S. at 495-96.
209. Codispoti, 418 U.S. at 516-17.
210. Id. at 517.
211. Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 2173 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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these two cases by the Court. The majority in Lewis argued that there
are special considerations in criminal contempt cases.212 Criminal
contempt often represents a rejection of the authority of the judge in
his courtroom, presenting a heated context in which the judge has ulti-
mate power to charge, convict, and sentence the accused.2 13 The ma-
jority in Codispoti saw in the contempt situation the "very likelihood
of arbitrary action that the requirement of jury trial was intended to
avoid or alleviate. ' 214 The majority in Lewis claims that these consid-
erations, combined with the absence of statutory maximum penalty,
were the impetus behind the aggregating of sentences in that case.21 5
However, it seems that these worries bear little relevance to aggrega-
tion of sentences. Besides, if these concerns were truly of such impor-
tance to the Court, the sentences need not be aggregated. The
likelihood of judicial misconduct overcomes the presumption of pro-
priety that allows the imposition of bench trials for petty offenses and
therefore all criminal contempt trials should be heard before a jury,
regardless of the length of sentence imposed. If the chance of judicial
misconduct is that significant, then any penalty is too great to be justi-
fied by judicial convenience. The Court, however, expressly rejected
the claim in Taylor that all criminal contempt cases should be tried
before the jury.216
If there is any doubt that these precedents call for a result different
than that reached by the Court in Lewis, the language of the decision
in Codispoti makes clear that the Court's recent decision is erroneous.
The Codispoti Court stated that, given the aggregate penalty of
greater than six months, the defendant "was tried for what was
equivalent to a serious offense and was entitled to a jury trial. ' '217
Contrast that to the statement by the majority in Lewis, that "[t]he
fact that the petitioner was charged with two counts of a petty offense
does not ... transform the petty offense into a serious one, to which
the jury-trial right would apply. '218 The respondent in Codispoti ar-
gued that the contempts were separate offenses, each petty in nature
because of the six month sentences, and that therefore there was no
right to a jury trial.219 The Court rejected that argument on the basis
that "the contempts arose from a single trial, were charged by a single
212. Id. at 2168.
213. Id.
214. Codispoti, 418 U.S. at 515.
215. Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 2168.
216. Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 495 (1974).
217. Codispoi, 418 U.S. at 517.
218. Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 2167.
219. Codispoti, 418 U.S. at 517.
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judge, and were tried in a single proceeding." 220 The Court was
clearly focusing on the nature of the prosecution, not the nature of the
individual offense.
3. The Court Swaps Constitutional Rights for Convenience
So far it has been shown that Lewis' constitutional right to a jury
trial was denied by the Court upon both questionable precedents and
uncertain reasoning-two of the actions denounced by Justice Mc-
Reynolds in his Clawans opinion. McReynolds' third admonition, that
constitutional guarantees ought not be subordinated to conven-
ience,221 is also ignored by the Lewis decision. Justice Black, in his
concurrence in Baldwin, had this opinion of the Court's decision that
a potential penalty of six months imprisonment gives no right to trial
by jury:
This decision is reached by weighing the advantages to the defend-
ant against the administrative inconvenience to the State inherent in
a jury trial .... [This] amounts in every case to little more than
judicial mutilation of our written Constitution. Those who wrote
and adopted our Constitution ... decided that the value of a jury
trial far outweighed its costs "for all crimes" and "[iun all criminal
prosecutions. '222
While this may be considered an extreme position and has never
gained majority support, it exhibits the principle that administrative
efficiency is a minor consideration in comparison to constitutional
rights, a principle that is present in much Supreme Court
adjudication.223
It is well settled in Supreme Court jurisprudence that the conse-
quences to defendants of convictions for petty offenses, absent the
right to jury trial, are minimal in comparison to the burden that would
be placed upon the judicial system if every minor infraction required a
jury trial.224 The Supreme Court claims that this is no slight to the
guarantees of the Sixth Amendment because the relatively minor in-
trusions upon personal freedom affected by petty offense convictions
220. Id.
221. District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 634 (1937); see supra note 171 and accom-
panying text.
222. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 75 (1970).
223. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 160 (1968).
224. Id. For an opposing view on this issue, see generally Aggregation of Sentences: Obtaining
Jury Trials for Petty Offenders, 59 IowA L. REV. 614 (1974). In presenting the argument that
providing jury trials for all offenses, petty or not, is workable, the author cited the practice by
California and Alaska of granting jury trials to all criminal defendants who request them. Id. at
618.
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were never intended by the framers to invoke a right to a jury trial.225
As the correctness of this decision is not at issue here, this determina-
tion is accepted. The majority opinion in Lewis, however, undertook
a whole new standard of balancing judicial efficiency against individ-
ual rights, one that has no foundation in the Court's history of limited,
justifiable intrusions on individual rights. Though it did not say so
outright, the Court clearly feels that it would be too burdensome on
the system to require prosecutors to bring separate proceedings for
each of multiple counts any time the government wants to avoid the
defendant's constitutional guarantee of a jury trial. This is plainly evi-
dent from the fact that the majority went out of its way to state that if
the Court found for the petitioner on the issue of right to a jury trial,
the government could bypass the jury trial right by trying the counts
separately.226 Therefore, the denial of a jury trial in this case is a mi-
nor infringement, easily justified by the State's interest in preserving
judicial efficiency by combining offenses into one prosecution.
No matter how the majority misread its precedent and how mud-
dled is its reasoning, one fact is inescapably clear: all previous Sixth
Amendment cases, whether decided with a focus on potential sen-
tence or actual sentence, have stood for the proposition that no judge
could sentence a defendant to a term of imprisonment of greater than
six months without awarding a jury trial.227 The Court's decision in
Lewis broke that chain in dramatic fashion by explicitly allowing im-
position of any length of sentence upon a defendant in a single prose-
cution, without granting a right to trial by jury so long as the charged
offenses are all petty in nature. The majority's confusing justification
for its decision failed to address this unprecedented proposition,
which led Justice Kennedy to call the majority holding "one of the
most serious incursions on the right to jury trial in the Court's
history .... ,,228
Since the exception for petty offenses had support in the law at the
time of the Constitution's drafting and the six-month line was sup-
ported by the decisions of numerous courts throughout the country, it
can be argued that no constitutional guarantees were subordinated by
those decisions. Here, the majority made an encroachment upon indi-
vidual liberty not supportable by any precedent and, solely for the
cause of judicial convenience, has stripped away a layer of constitu-
tional protection.
225. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 160.
226. Lewis v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 2163, 2168 (1996).
227. See supra note 4.
228. Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 2169.
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C. The Voices of the Lower Courts Fall on Deaf Ears
in Washington
The majority opinion, therefore, violated all three of Justice Mc-
Reynolds' cautionary instructions. The opinion can also be attacked,
however, on other grounds.
While the Supreme Court is not bound to follow the decisions of
any of the lower courts, previous cases deciding the right to a trial by
jury demonstrate that, in this area, the Court has always strongly con-
sidered the position of other courts throughout the nation in formulat-
ing rules regarding the Sixth Amendment. Once again, the decision in
Lewis breaks with Supreme Court tradition.
In Clawans, the Court, in determining whether there was a right to
a jury trial for an offense punishable by ninety days incarceration,
looked to the practices of the state courts in trying petty offenses with-
out a jury.229 The Court expressly stated that this record of judicial
decision and statutory interpretation by the states compelled its find-
ing that generally accepted standards of punishment permit a sentence
of ninety days in jail without a jury trial.230 In Duncan, the Court
closely surveyed the laws and cases of the states and their courts when
ruling on a Louisiana law that gave no right to a jury trial for serious
offenses.231 The Court found that a jury trial was a closely guarded
right in most states and, in part, based its decision on this evidence.232
In Baldwin, the Court surveyed the decisions of state and lower fed-
eral courts, finding that New York stood alone in denying a right to a
jury trial to a defendant facing a possible prison term of greater than
six months. 233 The Court stated, "[t]his near-uniform judgment of the
nation furnishes us with the only objective criterion by which a line
could ever be drawn-on the basis of the possible penalty alone" be-
tween serious and petty offenses. 234 Thus, it appears the Court de-
rived its bright-line rule from the decisions of these lower courts.
The Court lost its way in Lewis, not once looking to the approach
taken by the many lower courts which have faced this exact issue. The
majority stated that it granted certiorari to resolve a dispute among
the courts of appeals.235 The majority implied that all of the appellate
229. District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 626 (1937).
230. Id. at 626-27.
231. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 154 (1968).
232. Id. at 161-62.
233. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 71-72 (1970).
234. Id. at 72.
235. Lewis v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 2163, 2166 (1996). However, the Court may not have
been entirely ignoring the lower courts. In United States v. Stenzel, 49 F.3d 658, 660 (10th Cir.
1995), the Tenth Circuit held that a defendant had no constitutional right to a jury trial when he
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courts had considered this issue, except for the Second Circuit deci-
sion which brought Lewis before the Court, and had ruled that a de-
fendant charged with multiple petty offenses who faces an aggregate
possible penalty of greater than six months has a constitutional right
to a jury trial.236 The Second Circuit, in its decision in Lewis, even
admitted that it was rejecting the consensus opinion of all the other
appellate courts.237 Given this uniformity of approach among the
lower courts, it seems erroneous that the Court would feel compelled
to rule differently, especially given the Court's traditional use of the
lower courts as a barometer for the feelings of the country. The ma-
jority failed to even address this element in its opinion.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE COURT'S DECISION
In the short run, it seems that the lower courts are falling in line
with Lewis. While the Court was considering this case, the Eleventh
Circuit gave its ruling in United States v. Brown.238 The Eleventh Cir-
cuit followed the approach adopted by the Second Circuit in Lewis
and refused to aggregate the potential sentences of a defendant
charged with multiple petty offenses. 239 Since the Court decided
Lewis, two appellate courts have followed the Lewis decision. In Bur-
gess v. United States,240 the defendant was charged with two petty of-
fenses and faced a potential sentence of one year in prison.241 The
District of Columbia Court of Appeals held the case pending the out-
come of Lewis and then followed the Court's holding in that case by
refusing to grant a jury trial based on the potential aggregate
sentences.2A2 In United States v. Sherman,243 the Fourth Circuit con-
sidered the case of a defendant charged with three petty offenses, with
a potential aggregate sentence of eighteen months imprisonment. 2 "4
was charged with multiple petty offenses but was informed by the judge in a pre-trial determina-
tion that he would not be sentenced to greater than six months. Stenzel appealed to the
Supreme Court but the Court denied certiorari, 116 S. Ct. 123 (1995), three months before it
granted certiorari to Lewis, 116 S. Ct. 807 (1996).
Since the Tenth Circuit's decision clearly favored aggregation in the absence of a pre-trial
determination, it is arguable that the Court denied certiorari because it did not want to create
this new limit on Sixth Amendment rights without having any support from the federal appellate
courts.
236. See supra notes 62, 69 and 71.
237. United States v. Lewis, 65 F.3d 252, 254 (2nd Cir. 1995).
238. 71 F.3d 845 (11th Cir. 1996).
239. l& at 847.
240. 681 A.2d 1090 (D.C. 1996).
241. Id. at 1091.
242. Burgess v. United States, 680 A.2d 1033, 1034 (D.C. 1996) (en banc).
243. No. 95-5801, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 24953 (4th Cir. Sept. 25, 1996).
244. It at *2.
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The Fourth Circuit, which had ruled in favor of aggregation of poten-
tial sentences for the purpose of a jury trial in Coppins,245 noted that
Lewis overruled Coppins and therefore refused to grant the defendant
a jury trial.246 These cases show that the lower courts do not intend to
try to find a way around the Court's ruling in Lewis.
One could argue that Lewis will have little or no negative impact on
criminal defendants. As the Second Circuit stated in Lewis, Title 18,
Section 3584 of the United States Code allows consecutive sentencing
but presumes that multiple terms of imprisonment imposed at the
same time will run concurrently, unless the court orders otherwise.247
Section 3584 also presumes that multiple terms of imprisonment im-
posed at different times will run consecutively, unless the court orders
otherwise.248 Therefore, if aggregation of potential sentences was al-
lowed by Lewis and if prosecutors were able to properly avoid this
jury trial right by trying the charges separately,249 criminal defendants
would suddenly find themselves on the short end of the sentencing
presumption stick.
Another argument that will likely be made by supporters of the de-
cision in Lewis is that no court addressing this issue, either before or
after the Court's ruling in Lewis, has ever sentenced a criminal de-
fendant to greater than six months imprisonment for multiple petty
offenses without granting a right to a jury trial.250 It may be argued
that this whole issue is an academic argument; that the courts have
neither the predisposition nor the jail room to levy lengthy sentences
for multiple petty offenders.
Such an argument ignores the underlying purpose of the jury trial.
This right was included in the Sixth Amendment out of a fear of gov-
ernment oppression, corrupt prosecutors, and unethical judges.251 No
one would argue that most criminal cases in this country are decided
fairly by the governmental players and, thus, the lack of lengthy
sentences imposed on multiple petty offenders so far is not surprising.
However, the Supreme Court has squarely held that a criminal de-
245. United States v. Coppins, 953 F.2d 86 (4th Cir. 1991); see supra Part I.C. for a discussion
of Coppins.
246. Sherman, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 24953 at *3.
247. Lewis v. United States, 65 F.3d 252, 255 (2nd Cir. 1995).
248. 18 U.S.C. § 3584 (1994).
249. See supra note 112.
250. The courts in Sherman and Burgess were essentially given free reign by the Court's deci-
sion in Lewis and yet the sentences imposed were minor. Burgess was sentenced to concurrent
terms of six months imprisonment for his two convictions. Burgess v. United States, 680 A.2d
1033, 1034 (D.C. 1996) (en banc). Sherman received only a one year probation and $300 fine for
three misdemeanor convictions. Sherman, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 24953 at *2.
251. See supra Introduction.
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fendant may be sentenced in a single proceeding to greater than six
months imprisonment for multiple petty offenses, without the right to
trial by jury. The Court indicated no ceiling on the length of sentence
that may be imposed. The opportunity is present for just the type of
governmental oppression that was feared by the framers of the United
States Constitution. Any judge in this country has the ability to sen-
tence a criminal defendant to a year in jail, or two, or five, for commit-
ting crimes that the government itself considers petty. Any judge who
makes such a sentence now has the full support of the highest court in
the land. The Court's decision in Lewis is dangerous not for what
likely will happen but instead for what possibly could.
CONCLUSION
In Lewis v. United States,252 the Supreme Court ruled that a defend-
ant charged in one proceeding with multiple petty offenses has no
right to trial by jury, regardless of the potential aggregate sentence.
This decision is an unacknowledged departure from precedent. It is
based upon faulty reasoning which ignores the underlying purpose of
the jury trial right and it makes an unjustified concession to judicial
convenience and efficiency. The Court's holding also ignores the rul-
ings of the lower courts of the nation, which overwhelmingly reject the
approach adopted by the Court in Lewis. This decision sets a poor
precedent, not only for the effect it could have on future criminal de-
fendants, but also for the superficial review that the Court applied to
this case.
252. 116 S. Ct. 2163 (1996).
19971
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:191
